what problem made china reluctant to improve

what problem made china reluctant to improve

what problem made china reluctant to improve
what problem made china reluctant to improve

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American support for Taiwan made China reluctant to improve
relations with the US.

The Vietnam War

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what problem made china reluctant to improve

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American support for Taiwan

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The Vietnam War – APEX ✌️

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  • Addie Douglas ∙

    American support for Taiwan

    The Vietnam war

    American support for Taiwan

    American support for Taiwan
    The Vietnam War

    The Chinese were allied with the North Vietnamese, which made
    them reluctant to open relations with the United States.

    the Vietnam war

    South Vietnamese invasion of Laos

    South Vietnamese invasion of Laos

    South Vietnamese invasion of Laos

    South Vietnamese invasion of Laos
    American support for Taiwan

    South Vietnamese invasion of Laos
    American support for Taiwan

    South Vietnamese invasion of Laos
    American support for taiwan

    Richard Nixon improved relations with China.

    china was a growing and influential nation

    The Burlingame Treaty

    To improve trade relations.

    To improve trade relations.

    To improve trade relations.

    After Mao’s death in 1976.

    after Mao’s death in 1976

    the Chinese were allied with the north vietnamese

    He thought it would help in talks with the Soviets.

    President Nixon wanted better relations with China (People’s
    Republic of China) to balance the rising power of the Soviet Union.
    Chinese leaders were receptive because they were also worried about
    the USSR.
    By having better relations with China, President Nixon also
    hoped to improve relations with the USSR. Nixon also hoped to get
    help to resolve the Vietnam War. Nixon also hoped to improve
    economic relations with China.
    to give him more power in his actions toward the soviet
    union

    to improve relations with communist china

    #1. They were Communists.
    #2. Chiang Kai-shek was the US’s wartime ally, so they were
    reluctant to sever relations with him (although they eventually
    did).

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    Since 2018, relations between the U. S. and Taiwan have become official. This has made China reluctant to improve relations with the United States, as China does not consider Taiwan independent.

    The Cold War was entering a period of detente in which relationships between the US and Communist powers changed. China stood to benefit from improving relations. China needed export markets for her industrial goods and improved relations with the US would enable this.

    what problem made china reluctant to improve

    First of all, our relations with China have been, and will remain for the foreseeable future to be mixed, to be a complex combination of cooperation and contention. So the first thing is, don’t ever expect a kind of nirvana of peaceful, cooperative productive U.S.-China relations.

    Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own. There are many problems between China and the United States, including the potential trade war that has unsettled global financial markets. This isn’t the biggest problem between the two countries though.

    China and the United States are engaged in a major gamble with each other. The United States is gambling that, with increased engagement and especially with increased trade, it’ll become a more liberal society and more open society.

    It certainly depends on how the Chinese respond…. If they’re seen to be basically positive, this represents a chance to improve U.S.-China relations that hasn’t existed since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and indeed since 1989, with the Tianamen massacre.

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    Table of Contents

    Answer: The Taiwan issue, Korean and Vietnam wars.

    Since 2018, relations between the U. S. and Taiwan have become official. This has made China reluctant to improve relations with the United States, as China does not consider Taiwan independent.

    what problem made china reluctant to improve

    Ping-pong diplomacy was successful and resulted in opening the U.S.-PRC relationship, leading the U.S. to lift the embargo against China on June 10, 1971. On February 28, 1972, during President Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s visit to Shanghai, the Shanghai Communique was issued between the U.S. and the PRC.

    The Shanghai Communiqué explained how the United States and China would work toward better relations. IT was the document that both countries released when US President visited China in order to establish normal diplomatic relationships in order to solve the differences between the two.

    America’s 11th-largest export market in 2000, China has grown to become the third-largest destination for American goods and services. US exports to China directly and indirectly supported 1.8 million new jobs and $165 billion in GDP in 2015.

    The Cold War was entering a period of detente in which relationships between the US and Communist powers changed. China stood to benefit from improving relations. China needed export markets for her industrial goods and improved relations with the US would enable this.

    Result. Ping-pong diplomacy was successful and resulted in opening the U.S.-PRC relationship, leading the U.S. to lift the embargo against China on June 10, 1971. On February 28, 1972, during President Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s visit to Shanghai, the Shanghai Communique was issued between the U.S. and the PRC.

    during the 1970’s when Nixon was trying to get on good terms with China he sent a trade of ping pong players to compete against the Chinese ping pong players. By becoming friends with the Chinese Nixon was able to work out foreign affairs that other presidents could not handle. You just studied 6 terms!

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  • The seven-day official visit to three Chinese cities was the first time a U.S. president had visited the PRC; Nixon’s arrival in Beijing ended 25 years of no communication or diplomatic ties between the two countries and was the key step in normalizing relations between the U.S. and PRC.

    It has fostered peace in the Taiwan Strait and enabled Taiwan to evolve from an authoritarian state to a vibrant democracy. It has allowed cross-Strait social, economic, and cultural relations to flourish and bring real benefits to people in China and Taiwan, at no cost to the United States.

    Ping-pong diplomacy was successful and resulted in opening the U.S.-PRC relationship, leading the U.S. to lift the embargo against China on June 10, 1971.

    It allowed the United States and China to open the way for talks on more serious issues. It allowed the United States and China to negotiate at sporting events.

    The phrase “Nixon goes to China”, “Nixon to China”, or “Nixon in China” is a historical reference to United States US President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to the People’s Republic of China, where he met with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong.

    There’s a chance it was China. Today, the U.S. has an open-trade policy with China, which means goods are traded freely between the two countries, but it wasn’t always this way. On February 21, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon arrived in China for an official trip.

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    Introduction


    The China Challenge Is Not a Rerun


    A Balancing Act: U.S. versus Allied Interests


    How China Sees Each Dimension

    what problem made china reluctant to improve


    Misalignment Within the United States


    Closing the Gap


    Endnotes

    Throughout his campaign and administration, President Biden has stressed the need for America and its allies to work together to counter the rise of China and preserve a democratic world order. It’s an appealing message for the post-Trump era. The United States and its allies face many common challenges from China: supply chain dependencies, economic competitiveness, state-sponsored capitalism, human rights violations, greenhouse gas emissions, intellectual property (IP) theft, Belt and Road investments, “wolf warrior diplomacy,” increasing censorship, a rising military, a new space race, the origins of COVID-19, and more.

    But while global attitudes toward China are hardening and there are many areas where cooperation makes sense, the interests of the United States and its allies are not aligned in many of the most important areas. Europe, the Asia/Pacific region, and the developing world have significantly less incentive to confront China than America does. Only India and the United States are closely aligned on the essential issues, and even this could easily change.[1] Given these differences, the modest results of the recent G7 and NATO summits are not surprising. The key to meeting the challenge from China is for America to get its own house in order. America’s rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan has only reinforced this reality.

    As shown in figure 1, national interests in China are shaped by the relative impact of four main forces: 1) China’s importance as the world’s largest market for many products and services; 2) China’s role as the world’s largest supplier, accounting for some 25 percent of global manufacturing output; 3) China’s challenge as an ever-more capable business competitor, especially in advanced technologies; and 4) China’s emergence as a major military and geopolitical rival.[2] Different nations and regions weigh these four dimensions in very different, not easily reconciled ways.

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  • This four-part strategic framework helps us dispense with the idea that the challenge from China is like that of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, or Japan in the 1980s. The USSR was a military and geopolitical rival, but it was never any of the other three dimensions. Similarly, Japan was (and still is) strong in two dimensions: It remains a formidable business competitor as well as a major supplier in many industries. But it has never been an essential market for most U.S. firms, and since WWII, it has been a close Western ally. These limitations gave the United States considerable room to maneuver. It could impose strict controls on technology exports to the USSR without fear of retaliation, and it could leverage Japan’s reliance on the American security umbrella to wrest important concessions in areas such as semiconductors and automobiles.

    In contrast, China’s rapid progress along the four dimensions largely defines its emerging superpower status, as all four areas were once dominated by the United States. This multi-dimensional challenge is much more difficult for America to respond to, as actions in one dimension often have adverse effects on another. Compared to the Soviet Union and Japanese challenges, there are few easy options.

    However, these two earlier experiences are not without important lessons. Both histories suggest that what matters most is not alliances but rather the dynamics within the United States and China. The United States prevailed against the USSR and Japan partly because of things America did for itself, and partly because the weaknesses of its rivals were eventually exposed. Briefly revisiting both histories shows that the support of allies played a relatively minor role.

    The reasons behind the decline and eventual breakup of the Soviet Union are well known: the economic downsides of centralized planning, rigid and self-serving leadership, widespread corruption, ethnic tensions, and deep cynicism and distrust among the people. Although Japan’s economic challenges have been nowhere near this severe, its once-great electronics companies—such as Sony, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Toshiba, and NEC—did not respond effectively to a rapidly changing digital world. Neither did once-great American companies such as Sperry, Burroughs, Digital Equipment, Wang Laboratories, Data General, and others. But unlike the United States, Japan did not have a start-up culture that enabled new firms to rapidly replace the older ones.

    In short, both the USSR and Japan weakened substantially from within. But America also helped itself. The impressive scientific achievements of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s woke up a complacent United States, resulting in a vast expansion of research and development (R&D) funding, the creation of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Apollo lunar missions that helped restore confidence in America’s mixed-economy approach. Similarly, a range of competitiveness legislation in the 1980s, culminating in the 1989 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act helped America respond to the Japanese challenge. For example, the 1987 formation of SEMATECH helped protect the U.S. semiconductor industry from Japanese competition until the personal computer and Internet industries changed the digital game in America’s favor. Not surprisingly, there is now strong bipartisan support for similar government-funded technology initiatives.

    The key message is that the United States prevailed in both of these previous struggles by doing important things that helped its own cause, combined with the eventual stagnation or slowdown of its rivals. Today, China has many potential weaknesses: an aging population, widespread corruption and pollution; ethnic tensions; vast income inequalities; and increasingly authoritarian and centralized leadership. Whether these will halt China’s rise is unclear. However, the United States must also address its own societal and economic weaknesses and reinvigorate its still-great underlying strengths. America’s development of multiple COVID-19 vaccines might be an early sign of this change, but the persistence of COVID-19 variants and the wrenching pullout from Afghanistan limit near-term optimism.

    The four-part framework illustrates the balancing act required to serve certain American interests without undermining others. It also provides a starting point for comparing U.S. interests with those of other nations. While all four areas are complex, each has one overriding policy question:

    In recent years, America’s China-policy priorities have been shifting—from areas 1 and 2 toward areas 3 and 4. But applying this same four-part analysis to Europe, Asia, India, Russia, and the developing world reveals that other nations are much less keen on this shift. Although public opinion is turning against China in many countries, business and political leaders still believe their nations have much more to lose than gain by taking a more confrontational approach. Most do not see China as an existential threat to democratic world order—and even if they do, they see the value of letting the United States fight that fight while they continue to reap the benefits of Chinese trade.

    Given that the United States and Europe have many shared concerns regarding China—especially supply chain dependencies, industrial competitiveness, IP theft, human rights, and greenhouse gas emissions—it isn’t surprising that China is an increasingly important topic at G7, NATO, and other international gatherings. However, the strategic framework helps us see why the dynamics within each dimension tend to divide U.S. and European interests. Consider the realities:

    In short, Europe doesn’t feel the downside effects of the rise of China nearly as much America does. While both the United States and Europe are concerned about their dependency on Chinese suppliers, they differ in the other three areas. America worries about its huge global trade deficit; Europe doesn’t have one. America is concerned about China’s challenge to its world-leading technology industry; Europe lost the digital competition many years ago. The United States fears China’s military strength in the Pacific region; Europe has far less at stake and generally believes it can live under the U.S. defense shield. It’s very difficult for shared concerns about human rights and wolf warrior diplomacy to overcome these differences. Finally, while the EU played some role in containing the threat of Soviet expansionism—in large part because it was on their doorstep—it shows few signs of wanting to block the rise of China.

    This explains why U.S. calls for Western unity against China usually receive more rhetorical than substantive support. Most European leaders would rather not form blocs or choose between the two superpowers. Many would prefer not to talk about China at all, although this position is becoming untenable. The Biden administration was heartened to see the European Parliament put the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment on hold, and hopes it is a harbinger of changes to come. But the differences in interests and orientation remain, and this delay may well be temporary. Perhaps U.S. and European priorities can’t be truly aligned unless China becomes a near-term economic threat to core European industries such as automobiles, aerospace, chemicals, and machine tools.

    The three most strategic countries in terms of countering China in the Pacific Rim are Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The framework helps us understand their individual situations and identify the most likely scenarios going forward. A strong desire not to rock the boat is the overriding theme:

    Then there is Taiwan. As the world’s most advanced semiconductor manufacturer, its importance can’t be overstated. Both the United States and China are highly dependent on Taiwanese chips, and thus both nations see Taiwan as crucial to their future. If China eventually absorbs Taiwan the way it has Hong Kong, the regional and digital balance of power will shift decisively unless Western dependence on Taiwan has been reduced, as the United States would be dependent on China for critical semiconductors, including those used in advanced weapons systems. As it is widely believed that President Xi sees China’s sovereignty over Taiwan as a capstone to his legacy, it’s highly unlikely that this threat will go away. Perhaps the best America can hope for is that Taiwan’s strategic ambiguity continues at least through the 2020s, giving the United States time to develop alternative semiconductor sources.

    This analysis explains Asia’s cautious approach to China—one that is at odds with America’s desire for stronger and more-urgent actions. Businesses mostly prefer the status quo; Asian trade balances are generally favorable; the competitive challenges have been manageable; and public opinion has—at least until very recently—been less affected by COVID-19. Many Asian leaders must doubt whether in the long run China’s military dominance of the region can really be stopped. Therefore, there is a strong preference for stability, and little interest in confrontation and escalation. Business and national interests within Asia are significantly more aligned than they are in the United States.

    The framework also helps us see why India could become America’s most important bilateral relationship in terms of countering China over the course of the 2020s. As discussed below, there is close alignment along all four dimensions:

    However, this high level of alignment can’t be taken for granted. Although it’s easy to see the United States and India as natural partners—two democracies working to contain a rising Communist China—today’s cooperation is only a recent phenomenon. Throughout the Cold War, India was among the leaders of the Non-Aligned movement, which sought to avoid taking sides in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. And during the 1980s, the United States was much more closely aligned with India’s most direct rival: Pakistan.

    This history suggests that United States/India relations could easily change once again. Prime Minister Modi is up for re-election in 2024; the border tensions with China could recede; India’s long history of nonalignment might well resurface; India and China share many compelling economic interests; and India has its own self-sufficiency, Atmanirbhar Bharat, movement. Although the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia provides a forum for collective efforts to curb China, its ability to go beyond the dialog stage is anything but assured.

    A nightmare scenario for the United States would be the strategic combination of China’s manufacturing prowess and India’s strong software, professional services, and English language capabilities. If this scenario were to play out, the world’s economic center of gravity would likely shift decisively to the East. Maintaining close and productive ties to the Indian government and the Indian people should be among the Biden administration’s top diplomatic priorities.

    Arguably, no nation has more unique interests in China than Russia. Russia greatly values China as a market, mostly for its fossil fuels and military equipment. These sales are sufficient to broadly balance Russian imports from China, so concerns about China as a supplier are limited. There is also relatively little direct competition between Russian and Chinese firms, although this will change as Chinese military equipment becomes increasingly sophisticated. Lastly, China’s emergence as a military and geopolitical force has been broadly welcomed by President Putin as it supports his efforts to reduce America’s global leadership position. Russian business and national interests are very much aligned in these areas.

    It’s difficult to see these dynamics changing as long as President Putin remains in power. However, in a post-Putin world, Russia might rediscover its European roots and bristle at being the junior partner to an unpopular, authoritarian China. There are also potential Russia/China rifts in both central Asia and the northern Pacific. Any such shifts in Russian allegiances could be profound from a military and a geopolitical perspective. However, as Putin is just 68 years old, and shows no sign of retiring, America can’t expect anything like this any time soon.

    Although every country and region has specific interests and priorities, there are distinct patterns across the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the ASEAN nations, and Central Asia. Most of the focus is on China as a supplier (of goods, construction services, and financing) or on China as a market (for fossil fuels, minerals, raw materials, food, and other commodities). There is much less concern about directly competing with China, and even less about China as a military rival. Many authoritarian regimes overtly or quietly support China’s controls on the media and the Internet, and welcome the ability to play one superpower off of another. Many also identify as part of the oppressed “South,” fighting the century-long dominance of the North, a sentiment China plays to very well.

    Thus, the United States will continue to find it difficult to rally the developing world in sustained opposition to China. No wonder American leaders spend so much time discussing China with their European and Asian allies, and relatively little with everyone else.

    The four-part framework also helps us see the world as China sees it, especially how China sees the United States.

    For many years, China followed Deng Xiaoping’s advice: “Hide your strength, and bide your time.” But recently, China has adopted a more confrontational, wolf warrior approach, pressuring both other nations and its own citizens to bend to its will. China believes, with good reason, that it would likely prevail in any trade war versus the United States alone, so it’s very much in China’s interest to keep America and its friends divided. Fewer bullying words and actions would surely help China toward that end. However, it’s unclear whether President Xi is inclined to or capable of softening his approach.

    After more than a year of denial, America and much of the world has woken up to the possibility that the COVID-19 pandemic may not have emerged from a wet market in Wuhan but rather from one of China’s two institutes doing coronavirus research, both of which just happen to be located in Wuhan. China’s refusal to share information about both its gain-of-function research and its early COVID cases has added to these suspicions, as have its efforts to intimidate anyone who looks into these matters. There is no better example of China’s vast global influence than the way it has been able stifle discussion of this issue for so long. Even today, many governments, including that of the United States, seem reluctant to aggressively press China on this issue, essentially accepting China’s total lack of cooperation.

    But with millions of worldwide deaths and trillions of dollars in economic costs so far, one can only imagine the repercussions if the scientific and public consensus were to shift decisively to the laboratory-accident theory. An early checkpoint might be the Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in Beijing in February 2022. If leading nations conclude that, in all likelihood, the virus came from a government lab, democratic governments and corporate sponsors will need to rethink their level of participation, even if the athletes are permitted to attend. However, as of this report’s publication date, this scenario still seemed unlikely, as the United States had labeled its latest inquiry as “inconclusive.”

    More broadly, the COVID-19 narrative may be shifting. What began with China managing the pandemic far better than America and Europe, might end with the West developing the vaccines that get the virus under control. As the pandemic disrupts life on every continent, the West is increasingly seen as part of the solution, with China increasingly getting the blame. China will struggle to accept any major shifts in global perceptions, let alone demands for accountability or reparations. While the full truth may never be known and the pandemic is far from over, the origins of COVID-19 remain a potential game changer.

    It’s challenging enough that America’s interests in China are often so different from those of even its closest allies, and that there are so few easy China policy options. But equally problematic are the misalignments within the United States itself. In recent years, Americans have heard a lot about how their elites failed to see the dangers of a rapidly rising China. But this is only half of the story. The less-discussed problem has been the way the interests of U.S. multinational companies and the American national interest have diverged ever since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. Put bluntly, the rise of China has diminished America, yet provided a huge boost to many of America’s largest and most influential firms.

    The framework helps us see this misalignment. If asked, most Americans would surely say that China’s supply chain dominance, increasingly competitive companies, and rising military power are much more important challenges than the protection of U.S. business interests in China. However, for many American companies, sales within China are among their highest priorities. Starbucks has over 4,000 shops in China, McDonald’s has 2,200 restaurants, Marriott 400 hotels, and Walmart 430 stores. Apple’s China revenues are over $40 billion, Intel’s are over $20 billion, and Nike’s over $6 billion. China is the NBA’s and Hollywood’s largest non-U.S. market. These businesses are understandably reluctant to undermine their hard-earned China positions, which create jobs and other economic benefits in the United States.

    what problem made china reluctant to improve

    U.S.-based companies in financial services, health care, professional services, media, entertainment, travel, agriculture, energy, insurance, and education don’t see China as a major competitor (at least not yet). They see it as a market opportunity they can’t afford to miss. In contrast, only three major sectors—manufacturing, information technology, and aerospace/defense—see China as their main competitor. While these are critical (and politically important) industries, they make up only a small share of the U.S. economy. Similarly, only a few industries are highly dependent on China as a supplier. Electronic devices, industrial equipment, and household goods account for the bulk of America’s trade deficit with China.

    These fundamentally different business interests explain why proposals for strong U.S. actions against China often struggle to get broad-based business support. Companies that successfully do business in China don’t support them because they fear retaliation; companies that are heavy importers from China don’t support them because they tend to raise costs, disrupt operations, or both. The main support comes from those manufacturing firms that face intense competition from China, as well as from political and military leaders and much of the general public. Until recently, these latter voices lost the China policy debate more often than they prevailed.

    Fortunately, there is at least one area where America’s business and national interests are aligned. Many U.S. importers want to reduce their dependency on China and would like to find alternative sourcing—from the United States, Mexico, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, or elsewhere. Given sufficient incentives and public pressure, a steady reduction in dependency is achievable, although it will take time. China continues to have significant advantages in logistics, shipping, supply-chain clusters, scale, skills, and related business services, resulting in considerable inertia. Policymakers should help U.S. companies overcome these barriers, as doing so would weaken China, at least at the margin, while providing more security to the United States, and more degrees of freedom to take action.

    More aggressive measures such as tariffs, quotas, sanctions, and outright bans still face resistance from many corporate interests. The Trump administration, however clumsily, was willing to override these concerns and put national-security and competitiveness issues first, as evidenced by its 5G, software, and semiconductor bans on Huawei. The Biden administration has kept most of these policies in place, and hopes to get U.S. business support for an expanded China agenda, but seven months into the new administration, specific plans have yet to be articulated. The recent decision to allow Huawei to buy U.S. semiconductors for use in automobile components suggests a slight softening of position.

    In developing its policies and pursuing its “Build Back Better” agenda, the new administration should try to close America’s alignment gaps and avoid an economically damaging go-it-alone confrontation with China. Such an initiative should include policies that:

    These and similar actions can enable U.S. businesses to continue to succeed in China without having to sell their home nation short. Over time, they could help reduce America’s dependencies, bring jobs back to the United States, and give employees a greater stake in their companies’ success. Coupled with the needed increases in government funding for R&D and related strategic manufacturing that are now receiving bipartisan support in Congress, they can steadily improve both America’s competitiveness and its balance of trade.

    Importantly, these actions could be taken without demanding or expecting China to change its ways, and without relying on overtly anti-China policies or rhetoric. They could also be done with or without the support of America’s allies. Indeed, many U.S. friends should adopt similar policies, as it’s in their interest to do so. To remain world-leading companies through the 2020s and beyond, American businesses need to succeed in China. But in pursuing these opportunities thus far, they have accelerated China’s rise. With the proper policies, incentives, and support, they could do the same for America’s resurgence—and if they do, the friends and allies of the United States will surely follow.


    About the Author

    David Moschella (@dmoschella) is a nonresident senior fellow at ITIF, specializing in digital technology and global business competition. His books include Seeing Digital—A Visual Guide to the Industries, Organizations, and Careers of the 2020s (DXC, 2018); Customer-Driven IT (Harvard Business School Press, 2003); and Waves of Power—The Dynamics of Global Technology Leadership (Amacom,1997). He was previously head of worldwide research for both International Data Corporation (IDC) and The Leading Edge Forum.


    About ITIF

    The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan research and educational institute focusing on the intersection of technological innovation and public policy. Recognized by its peers in the think tank community as the global center of excellence for science and technology policy, ITIF’s mission is to formulate and promote policy solutions that accelerate innovation and boost productivity to spur growth, opportunity, and progress.


    For more information, visit itif.org.

    [1]David Moschella and Robert D. Atkinson, “India Is an Essential Counterweight to China—and the Next Great U.S. Dependency” (ITIF, April 2021), https://itif.org/publications/2021/04/12/india-essential-counterweight-china-and-next-great-us-dependency.

    [2]David Moschella and Robert D. Atkinson, “Competing With China: A Strategic Framework” (ITIF, August 2020), https://itif.org/publications/2020/08/31/competing-china-strategic-framework.

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